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THE JAmES F. BROWN PRIZE ComPErTION.-The topic for dis.
cussion in the first annual James F. Brown Prize Competition,
announcement of the establishment of which was made in June,
1920, issue of this QUARTERLY, is:

"What

are the Privileges

and Immunities Guaranteed to Citizens by the Federal Constitution ?" The prize for this year has been awarded to Mr. Stanley
C. Morris, of the graduating class of the College of Law. All
papers were to be filed not later than May 15. The prize is the
income for one year from $5,000.00.

THE RIGHT OF A STATE TO TAx INTERSTATE ComMERCE.--To

what extent does the commerce clause prevent a state from taxing
interstate commerce? In a recent important decision 2 the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held, inter alia, that interstate commerce in oil and gas produced within the 'state is not
1 U. S. CONST., Art. 1, 1 8: "The Congress shall have power. . . . to regulate
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian
tribes."
2 Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 105 S. E. 506 (W. Va. 1921).
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taxable by the state although the same sort of intrastate commerce
in oil and gas is taxed in precisely the same way.3 The court
based its decision on the ground that under the commerce clause
"a state cannot levy any tax upon interstale commerce."' 4
Is it true, however, that in the language of the court "a state
cannot levy any tax upon interstate commerce?'? It must be
admitted, of course, that the United States Supreme Court, the
ultimate arbiter of the question, has often used language to
that effect.5 But in law as elsewhere actions speak louder than
words, and the extent of the right of a state to tax interstate
commerce must, therefore, be determined rather by what the
court does than by what it says-more accurately perhaps by
what the court does in the majority of its later decisions. *What
then is the extent of the thus-determined right of a state to tax
interstate commerce?
This question has recently been very
ably and exhaustively discussed by Professor Thomag Reed
Powell in a series of eight lengthy articles in the Harvard Law
Review." In the last of these articles, published in June, 1919,
Professor Powell comes to the followng conclusion: 7 "If judges
do in fact permit the states to tax interstate commerce .....
that commerce. ....
may be taxed by the states, all doctrine
to the contrary notwithstanding .....
.If we discard all the
doctrinal disquisitions of the opinions and look only to the results of the decisions, we find that the controlling motive of the
Supreme Court has been the desire to prevent the states from
imposing upon interstate commerce any peculiar or unusual
burden. Where the court has been assured that the states did
not have a device which might be operated to discriminate
3 The taxing statute provides, inter alia, as follows:

corporation engaged

in

"Every person, firm and

this state in the transportation of either crude oil or pe

troleum. . or of natural gas. . . by means of pipe lines for sale to consumers
within or without the state or use within or without the state In the making of any

products derived therefrom, shall pay to the state as an annual privilege tax for
engaging in such business in the state, two cents for each barrel of crude oil or
petroleum. . . . and one-third of one cent for each thousand feet of such natural
gas as is so transported or conveyed within this state.
ACTS OF WEST VA.,
EXTRAORD.
SEES. 1919, ch. 5.
4 Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, supra, at p. 510.
The court added that this

"is the uniform doctrine of this court, as well as the Supreme Court of the United
States."
See, e. g., Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489 (1887)

Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 127 U. S. 640 (1888) ; Crutcher v,. Kentucky, 141 U. S.
47 (1891).
See also PRENTICE AND EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL
CONsTITETIOx, 201:
"Upon Interstate commerce the state can lay no tax In any

form."
a Thomas Reed Powell, "Indirect Encroachment on Federal Authority by the
Taxing Powers of the States," 31 HARV. L. Rv. 321, 572, 721, 932, and id., 32
IAHv. L. REv. 234, 374, 634, 902.
7 32 HARV. L. REV. 902. 917.

Italics ours.
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against interstate commerce, taxation of that commerce has been
a~lowed."
If Professor Powell's conclusion is correct, then, of course,
it is not correct to hold, as was held in the principal case, that
"a state cannot levy any tax upon interstate commerce." It is
admittedly impossible to reconcile all that the Supreme Court
has said, or even held, with respect to this question; and the
decisions are far too numerous to justify an attempt, within the
limits of a note, to make a detailed examination of th cases. But
a few recent decisions of the Supreme Court will, it is believed,
sufficiently illustrate the soundness of Professor Powell's conclusion and, therefore, to a certain extent the unsoundness of the
court's conclusion in the principal case. For example, a tax upon
the net income from commerce is, of course, a tax upon the colnmerce itself, at any rate in practical effect, and it is now pretty
well settled that under the commerce clause the constitutionality
of a state regulation is to be determined by its practical effect in
operation and not by the mere form in which the regulation is
clothed." Yet the Supreme Court has recently held that a state
may tax the net income from interstate commerce when the tax is
levied in the same way on income from intrastate commerce. s The
reason is that such a tax, not being expressly prohibited by the
Constitution, cannot be reasonably said to be impliedly prohibited,
for the tax does not diseiminate against interstate commerce, but
merely requires interstate commerce to contribute its fair share
of the expenses of government. The interstate commerce clause
was inserted in the Constitution for the purpose of preventing
dissentions resulting from attempts by a state to obtain undue advantages over other states by discriminatory regulations of interstate commerce.' 0 It was not the purpose of the clause-it could
not reasonably be a purpose of the clause-to relieve interstate
commerce from the duty imposed upon intrastate commerce to
contribute a non-discriminatory share of the expenses of government. Hence, as such a tax is not expressly prohibited by the
a As the United States Supreme Court declared in a recent case: "It hardly
is necessary to repeat that when this court Is called upon. to test a state.tax by
the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, our decision must depend
not upon the form of the taxing scheme. '.
but rather upon the practical opera.
tion and effect of the tax as applied and enforced." Wagner p. City of Covington,
251 U. S. 95, 102.
9 United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, 247 U. S. 321 (1918).
,0 County of Mobile -v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691. 697 (1880).
See THE FEDERALisT, No. 7.
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Constitution, there is no plausible reason why commerce, merely
because interstate commerce, should escape from the ordinary bur-den of taxation imposed upon the same sort of intrastate comInerce.
WVhen the interstate commerce has a taxable situs in the state
(and that is the class of commerce we are here dealing with) the
usual justification for taxation, viz.,.protection by the taxing state
of the subject matter of the tax, applies to such interstate commerce in substantially the same way that it applies to intrastate
commerce. The act or occupation of engaging in commerce in
natural gas or oil produced within the state is protected by the
state when the commerce is partly interstate in substantially the
:same way that it is protected when the commerce is wholly intrastate. Hence, in return for this protection, the state should be allowed to levy a non-discriminatory tax upon such interstate commierce. Since such a tax is not expressly prohibited by the comnerce clause, and since such a tax does not contravene either the
original purpose or any reasonably conceivable purpose of the
commerce clause, such a tax is not impliedly prohibited by the
commerce clause and, therefore, is constitutional. 1
Where a tax is upon interstate commerce as such without any
corresponding tax upon similar intrastate commerce such a tax
operates as a discrimination against interstate commerce, and
should, therefore, be considered an unconstitutional interference
with the freedom of commerce. But where, as in the principal
case, the commerce taxed is partly intrastate commerce and partly
interstate commerce, and each class of commerce is conducted in
the same way, thus receiving the same sort of state protection, there
is no plausible reason why the state in return for this protection
should not be allowed to tax each of these classes of commerce so
long as the state does not tax by "a device which might be operated
'Ll The proposition herein contended for is further illustrated by another recent
decision of the United States Supreme Court. In that case, Wagner v. City of
Covington. supra, A imported goods into state X from state Y and sold the goods
in state X. The sales were made from the vehicle In which the goods were Imported, and the goods were sold in wholesale lots in the original packages. The
Supreme Court held that a tax by state X on the privilege of engaging in such
commerce did not violate the commerce clause, as the tax was levied in the same
'way upon the privilege of engaging in such commerce when the goods were not
imported from another state. The court admitted that such a tax would violate
the commerce clause if it "amounted to a discrimination against the products of
other states and therefore to an interference with commerce among the states."
But in the case before the court there was no discrimination against interstate
commerce and, therefore, no reason why such commerce should not bear a nondiscriminatory share of the expenses of the government whirh protects it.
For a
collection and discussion of other cases in point, see Powell, op cit., supra.
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to discriminate against interstate commerce."'" It would be a perversion of the purpose of the commerce clause to apply the clause
so as to compel the states, in levying taxes, to discriminate against
intrastate commerce and thus subsidize interstate commerce at
the expense of intrastate commerce. The function of the commerce clause is to prevent the states from discriminating against
interstate commerce, not to compel the states to discriminate in
1
.favor of it. "
As the Supreme Court said with reference to a state tax on the
met income received from both interstate commerce and intrastate
commerce, so we may say with reference to a state tax levied alike
on all commerce, interstate and intrastate, in oil and gas produced
within the state:14 "Such a tax... .. is but a method of distributing the cost of government, like a tax upon property, or upon
franchises treated as property; and if there be no discrimination
against interstate commerce, either in the admeasurement of the
tax or in the means adopted for enforcing it, it constitutes one of
the ordinary and general burdens of government, from which persons and corporations otherwise subject to the jurisdiction of the
states are not exempted by the Federal Constitution because they
happen to be engaged in commerce among the States."
-T. P. H.

"AccmENTAL" IN SECTION 26 or
WORKMEN'S ComPENsATIoN AcT.-Section 26 of Chapter 15P
of the West Virginia Code provides as follows:
INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD

VEIE

"All employers subject to this act, the state of West Virginia excepted, who shall not have elected to pay into the
workmen's compensation fund the premiums provided by this
act, or having so elected, shall be in default in the payment
of the same, or not having otherwise complied fully with the
provisions of section twenty-four of this act, shall be liable
to their employees (within the meaning of this act) for damages suffered by reason of accidental personal injuries sustained in the course of employment caused by the wrongful
act, neglect or default of the employer, or any of the employer's officers, agents or employees, and also to the personal
12See Powell, op. cit., 32 HAV. . R m. 902, 917. See also 26 M-av. I.
558, 360.
Is See 25 W. VA. L. QuAR. 222, 224.
U United States Glue Co. v. Oak Creek, supra, at p. 329. Italics ours.
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